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In 1966, during a speech in New York City, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara announced that he would lower the mental 
and physical standards for admission into the Armed Services. 
McNamara based his decision on government reports1 which had 
studied the rejectees. He promised that the new program, “Project 
100,000” (POHT), would uplift America’s “subterranean poor” and 
cure them of the “idleness, ignorance, and apathy” which marked their 
lives. Proclaiming that these young men “have not had the opportunity 
to earn their fair share of this nation’s abundance, but they can be 
given an opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes,”2 
the Secretary predicted that men recruited under POHT would return 
to the civilian world able to earn two to three times the amount that 
they would have earned had they not entered the military.3
Although the original announcement of Project 100,000 did 
not specifically mention the problems of black Americans, in a speech 
called “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ills,” presented to the National 
Association of Educational Broadcasters, the Secretary of Defense 
claimed that POHT was created to assist black men in overcoming a 
heritage of poverty and deprivation. McNamara claimed that the DOD 
had the “potential for contributing to the solution of the social 
problems wracking our nation.”4 He described POHT as a step towards 
restoring the self-respect of these men, citing high black failure rates 
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, as well as Moynihan’s theory 
of the cycle of family poverty.5 An excerpt from the speech reads:
What these men badly need is a sense o f personal 
achievement—a sense o f succeeding at some task—a sense 
o f their own intrinsic potential.... They have grown up in an 
atmosphere o f drift and discouragement. It is not simply the
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sometimes squalid ghettos o f their external environment that 
has debilitated them—but an internal and more destructive 
ghetto o f personal disillusionment and despair: a ghetto of 
the human spirit.6
McNamara announced that Project 100,000 would enlist or 
induct 40,000 men by June of 1966. He neglected to mention General 
Hershey’s declaration that escalating the war effort would require a 
monthly draft call of up to 40,000 men by October 1966. Perhaps he 
felt that the juxtaposition of those two pieces of information could lead 
to a line of questioning which would be uncomfortable for the Johnson 
Administration. In fact, his August 1966 speech gave no indication 
that rising manpower needs had any relationship to the decision to 
implement POHT. He also failed to point out that Congress had refused 
to fund his project, and that he planned to finance it out of the DOD’s 
regular budget. Instead, McNamara made four promises about the 
program: New Standards Men (the term for men enlisted under POHT) 
would receive the same basic training as regular soldiers and all the 
special assistance they required; New Standards Men (NSM) would be 
trained in skills useful in military occupations and would have access 
to the best technological and military specialties; NSM would learn 
self-discipline by absorbing the military system; and, NSM would 
receive veterans’ benefits after their service in the Armed Forces. 
Declaring that the Armed Forces had previously maintained 
unreasonably high standards for admission, McNamara predicted 
that POHT would enlist up to 150,000 NSM a year.
Virtually no historical research has been done on Project 
100,000, and the Johnson Administration’s motives have remained 
obscure. The historical works which do mention POHT seldom devote 
more than a paragraph to the program, and their authors frequently 
accept the administration’s explanation without probing more deeply.7 
Most military, political, and social histories of the Vietnam War fail to 
note Project 100,000 as a policy of historical and cultural significance. 
By focusing on three areas—a short history of Project 100,000, an 
overview of discriminatory politicies in the military, and a look at the 
military’s treatment of rejectees—I hope to establish some basis for 
drawing conclusions about the Administration’s investment in POHT. 
The information contained in this essay is based on the small 
collection of available documents on Project 100,000, and should 
serve as an indication that a full scale study on the current status of 
POHT veterans deserves to be pursued.
Project 100,000 represented a landmark in both American 
domestic and foreign policy. The domestic policy of “helping” 
underprivileged blacks provided the troops necessary to carry out US
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foreign policy in Vietnam. Moynihan’s theory that military training 
and discipline could solve poor black men’s social and educational 
problems gave the Johnson Administration an excuse to draft these 
men and send them into combat.8 Motivated by issues of race and 
racial paternalism, POHT failed in every way to benefit black Americans. 
Few NSM received the promised remedial education, few improved 
their post-war employment status, and many came home wounded; 
many did not come home at all.
Ironically, POHT also failed to benefit the military establishment. 
It provided the Armed Services with incapable, often mentally disabled 
soldiers. The first page of Moynihan’s report, The Negro Family, ends 
with a quote from Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: “America 
is free to choose whether the [black American] shall remain her liability 
or become her opportunity.” Moynihan’s use of Myrdal is ironic, as 
Myrdal would probably not have supported the choices which 
Moynihan’s report urged Johnson and McNamara to make. By creating 
Project 100,000, the American government made a choice Myrdal did 
not envision: it exploited black Americans, using them as cannon 
fodder while cloaking their betrayal in the rhetoric of advancement. 
America had turned liability into opportunity—but not for the black 
man.
A  B rieF History of PRojECT 100,000
The DOD had lofty goals for New Standards recruits. Every 
branch of the military was tpld it had to accept a certain percentage 
of them in its quarterly quotas, with the Army required to take 25% of 
its quota from POHT, the Marines 18%, and the Navy and Air Force 
15%-9 Most rejectees had failed the AFQT; under POHT the military 
would accept them anyway, provided that they could demonstrate 
over time that they had higher intellectual abilities than their test 
scores indicated. The DOD also specified that the training, performance, 
and achievement data for each NSM had to be updated bi-annually.10
Between October 1966andJune 1969, POHTreceived 246,000 
recruits. The population of POHT men differed considerably from 
regular servicemen; 50% of POHT, versus 28% of regular servicemen, 
were from southern states." The median score of POHT men on the 
AFQT was 13.6,12 If curing “ignorance, idleness, and apathy” could not 
be achieved on a volunteer basis, mandatory induction represented 
the next best alternative. 47% of all NSM were drafted.13
As studies of rejectees had indicated, most NSM came from 
economically unstable homes with non-traditional family structures. 
70% came from low-income backgrounds, and 60% came from single­
parent families. Over 80% were high school dropouts, 40% read below 
a sixth grade level, and 15% read below a fourth grade level. 50% had
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IQs of less than 85.14
“Vietnam: Hot, Wet, and Muddy—Here’s the Place to Make a 
Man!” enthused an advertisement placed by POHT recruiters in Hot 
Rod Magazine. The Army and the Marines stressed glamor and 
excitement, as well as training, as part of a soldier’s job, andmanymen 
volunteered for dangerous assignments because recruiters made 
them sound like adventures. SS targeted low-income ghetto areas— 
particularly those where high concentrations of blacks lived—for their 
advertising campaigns.
In Oakland, California during one year, POHT recruited 120 
men from lower income groups, out of a total of 125 enlisted by SS. 
90% of these recruits had placed in Category 4 or 5 (Category 4 men 
were considered marginally qualified for service, and Category 5 men 
were previously disqualified) ; most of them were black or Chicano 
youths with police records.15 During the five years POHT lasted, an 
average of 40% of NSM were black. This figure contrasted sharply with 
the black 8% of the Service population. DOD certainly heeded 
Moynihan’s call to overrepresent black men in the Armed Forces.
Project 100,000 took in 149,000 men during its first year—an 
increase o f9,000 over McNamara’s original projection. After that first 
year, the Secretary of Defense told the public that “our Project 100,000 
is succeeding beyond even our most hopeful expectations.”16
All NSM entered regular basic training. 17,000 men took 
remedial reading courses in order to achieve a fifth or sixth grade 
reading level17; 6% took transition programs of educational or vocational 
training.19 After six weeks, the Armed Forces found 17% of the men 
still unable to read at a fifth grade level.20 Although these men had not 
yet met the minimum literacy standards required by the service, they 
were not recycled (sent back to take the course again). Instead, they 
were assigned to basic combat training or special motivational platoons 
for extra discipline. The Marine Corps had no remedial reading 
program: "We are not impressed with the long term effects of a short 
term remedial reading program,” said a Marine Corps general.21
In training courses other than remedial reading, POHTrecruits 
confronted other difficulties. Continental Army Command (CONARC), 
which conducted technical and other high level skills courses, 
determined that the presence of NSM in many of these courses 
hindered the progress of other students. CONARC recommended that 
NSM be excluded from 64 of 237 entry level “advanced individual 
training” (AIT) courses because slow learning and comprehension 
abilities prohibited NSM from meeting academic course prerequisites. 
In 1968 the Army decided to exclude NSM from 54 additional courses 
because of the group’s previous poor performance and attrition rate. 
The Army next revised course prerequisites for 37 more courses in 
order to exclude NSM, before banning them from another 19 courses.
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John Grant was one example of a POHT recruit. With an IQ 
of 66, he could not do simple arithmetic. At the age of 15 he 
had married his pregnant wife, and the year Grant served in 
the military, he went AWOL fifteen times. Kenny Matts was 
another POHT recruit. Retarded as the result of a childhood 
brain injury, Matts could not take notes or spell. After failing 
the Armed Forces media training course, he went AWOL. Both 
Grant and Matts joined the services because they were drawn 
to its advertised programs for disadvantaged teenagers. Gus 
Peters came from a broken home, left school after finishing 
eighth grade, and was unemployed when he enlisted. Also in 
poor physical condition, Peters had an IQ of 62. He scored in 
the 10th percentile on the Armed Forces pre-enlistment 
aptitude test, and later failed basic training due to poor 
literacy skills17. Once in the service, Peters’ mental inabilities 
prevented him from completing training as a tank driver. 
Ridiculed by fellow soldiers, he went AWOL and was released 
with an Undesirable Discharge after only six months in the 
Armed Forces. Demoralized and without confidence, Peters 
experienced much unpleasantness, and acquired no skills 
during his short stint in the military.18
Of all AIT courses only five were restructured to accommodate POHT 
recruits.22
Even in the five restructured courses—Marine Hull Repair, 
Engineer Equipment, Wheel Vehicle Mechanic, Switchboard Operator, 
Supplyman—the Army had problems with NSM. Instructors found 
that NSM required more attention than other students, and more time 
to absorb class material, during which more competent trainees 
became bored. The Armed Forces was finding Project 100,000 
increasingly time consuming and expensive.23
By April 1968 the service found only 68% of NSM eligible for 
any AIT courses.24 Most NSM could not qualify for any advanced skills 
or technical specialty training; many received “soft skill” or menial 
jobs. The DOD, however, had another use for those NSM denied 
training. Over 40% received combat-related assignments, and 37% 
went to the infantry in Vietnam.25 The high numbers of black combat 
troops which POHT later brought to Vietnam added to disproportionate 
black casualty numbers.
A  1969 study by the Comptroller General’s Office and the 
Department of the Army cast doubt on McNamara’s initial assessment 
of the progress of POHT. Though the report, titled “The Management
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of Project 100,000,” called the program “a marked success,” the 
study’s conductors also publicized many negative results of POHT, 
and issued a number of criticisms.
The Department of the Army study found major 
problems with POHT training programs. NSM required enormous 
amounts of remedial reading training, but could not receive it because 
of the shortage of instructors and facilities. To remedy the situation, 
the Army would have had to spend a great deal of money and hire many 
additional personnel. Men who came Into POHT under the medical 
remedied program had an extremely high discharge rate. Many costs 
associated with POHT, such as time costs and the cost of giving the 
other men less attention, could not be estimated. The continuous 
“recycling” (repetition of courses until NSM received a passing grade) 
which many NSM required made the reporting system impractical and 
deficient, since officers were reluctant and sometimes unable to 
complete the many special POHT reports.
The GAO had several suggestions for reforming POHT, including 
the recommendations that SS prevent the enlistment of men whose 
mental conditions demanded more than six weeks of training, and 
that local personnel be given adequate instructions for completing 
POHT reports. In addition, the GAO suggested that the Armed Forces 
establish reliable cost data for the training of NSM. The DOD accordingly 
formulated new policies for POHT. Stipulating that those who failed to 
meet minimum performance standards during or after training would 
be released, DOD specified that during the initial training phase, NSM 
would receive all the additional time they needed to complete the basic 
course. DOD also instructed Armed Forces officers to constantly 
monitor the individual and group progress of POHT recruits. The 
military establishment had gradually made impossible the realization 
of McNamara’s initial promise of equal, specialized training and 
valuable experience for NSM.
Throughout the program’s tenure, DOD supervisors reported 
that 90% of the men received excellent ratings of conduct and 
efficiency.26 The joint GAO-Army report, however, noted that faulty 
and inaccurate recordkeeping cast doubt upon many of DOD’s claims. 
Many members of the military establishment, especially those who 
worked directly with NSM, openly criticized and disparaged the 
program.27
Like the GAO and DOA, Armed Services officers found that 
POHT men needed more time—and money—than regular soldiers. 
Many NSM required remedial education, in addition to the basic skills 
taught in boot camp. In order to achieve the minimum literacy and 
skill levels required to advance, these men (frequently called “the 
moron corps” by their military peers) often had to recycle. Many NSM
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never passed some of the courses, no matter how many times they 
recycled.
Officers complained that they had to “babysit" these men, who 
sometimes could not master the most basic skills, such as brushing 
their teeth.28 In an Army Times editorial, one Army officer expressed 
the sentiment that the services, already preoccupied with fighting, 
should not take on the war against poverty. The military did not have 
the desire, the time, the money or the resources with which to assume 
responsibility for such a program, regardless of the DOD’s professed 
altruism.
At the heart of career officers' criticism of POHT was the feeling 
that the military—especially during wartime—should not serve as a 
social welfare program. Another Army Times editorial claimed that 
past performances by rejectees showed that the Armed Forces could 
only expect “poor mileage" from NSM. Many military men were aware 
of the results of an important study conducted by Eli Ginzburg, a 
Columbia University professor. Ginzburg’s report. The Ineffective 
Soldier, examined poor soldier performance in World War 2. His 
conclusions should have caused readers of the Moynihan and Marshall 
Commission reports to regard their conclusions as doubtful. Ginzburg's 
results indicated that intelligence and education were important 
qualities in good soldiers. In fact, his findings determined that high 
school dropouts were five times as likely to perform poorly in battle 
than college students, and three times more likely than high school 
graduates.29
In 1969, troop numbers in Vietnam began to decrease as the 
US de-escalated the Vietnam War. As the ceilings dropped, the 
number of recruits in POHT fell. Although McNamara had originally 
presented POHT as a social welfare program which would annually 
recruit up to 150,000 men, the military evidently had no desire to 
utilize these men in a peacetime army.
DOD cited several reasons for phasing out POHT. Revising 
their earlier estimations, they claimed that the program had been 
extremely expensive and not very successful. The Air Force, for 
example, spent 14% of its budget on its 14% quota of NSM, and even 
this was not enough, because 39% of their POHT recruits required 
additional funding in order to recycle basic training.30 Military officials 
explained to the DOD at the 1970 House Appropriations Committee 
hearings that de-escalation had reduced the numerical strength of the 
Armed Forces and that they had cut POHT numbers accordingly. They 
reasoned that if they continued to enlist 100,000 Category 4 men every 
year, these men would eventually constitute too large a percentage of 
the total troops, and would downgrade overall military standards and 
efficiency.
In 1970, SS set the POHT quota at 75,000. In 1971 it dropped
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the number to 50,000, and in 1972 the DOD officially terminated 
Project 100.000.31 Even before the quota decreased, the Armed Forces 
had independently begun to eliminate more men during basic training, 
effectively restoring higher pre-Vietnam rejection rates. In 1968, the 
Marines released 6.8% of all Category 4 recruits because of mental 
inability. In 1969 they rejected 10.5%, in 1970 33.9%, and in 1971 
46.1%-32 Spurred by the career military’s opposition to POHT, the 
Armed Services took the initiative in eliminating these men from their 
ranks.
The military accepted some Category 4 troops until 1977, but 
the DOD now asserts that the military can not serve as an appropriate 
environment in which to rehabilitate the disadvantaged. Recent 
legislation prohibits the use of mental group quotas in military 
recruitment. Unfortunately, the military reached these conclusions 
too late for many NSM.
Almost all Category 4 soldiers entered the services under 
POHT. Their court-martial rate was 3% (as opposed to 1.4% for the 
control group of other soldiers) while their rate for nonjudicial 
punishments was 13.4% (as opposed to 8.2% for the control group).33 
Studies showed that Category 4 soldiers were three times more likely 
than other soldiers to go AWOL during basic training, twice as likely 
to receive early discharges, and two-and-a-half times as likely to be 
court-martialed.34 One third of NSM (approximately 360,000) were 
discharged for absence or disciplinary offenses. Of these, 80,000 of 
them received Dishonorable, Bad Conduct, or Undesirable Discharges, 
and 100,000 of them received General Discharges.35 Some 36,000 
POHT troops were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged before 
serving their first eighteen months36.
While many NSM came home disabled, and many others died, 
those who returned physically intact faced the same difficulties as 
other Vietnam veterans in terms of employment, emotional and family 
instability, and post traumatic stress disorders. Because a large 
percentage of NSM experienced combat, stress disorders may be even 
more widespread in POHT veterans. The difficulty many veterans 
faced in finding post-war employment was exacerbated in the cases of 
the many POHT veterans who had received less than honorable 
discharges. Deprived of promised training and education, these men 
had little prospect of earning the doubled or tripled income which 
McNamara had promised them.
Because McNamara insisted that the military avoid stigmatizing 
these men, their records contained only cursory indications of their 
status. This poor recordkeeping initially resulted in many NSM failing 
to receive special training, and later receiving no special attention 
from the Veterans Administration. The VA has repeatedly denied
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many benefits, even on appeal, to the numerous POHT men who 
received less than honorable discharges.
McNamara also demanded that NSM should never be informed 
of their unique status, so that they would not feel as if they were 
government charity cases. The long-term result of this ignorance is a 
group of men who cannot fight for the special treatment they deserve 
because they do not know who they are.
The injustices suffered by POHT veterans were intensified in 
the cases of black NSM. Since 40% ofPOHTmen were black, their post­
war activities are included in various studies of black veterans. In 
1969, when the Armed Forces released their first group of POHT 
recruits, the unemployment rate for black veterans was 8.5% The rate 
rose to 16% by 1971. Although unemployment rates among black 
veterans dropped to 14%in 1972, during one month of that yearitwas 
as high as 22%. In 1972, while the overall rate for black vets had 
dropped to 11%, the rate among black veterans between the ages of 20 
and 24 was 16.3%.37 As 21 was the average age of NSM through POHTs 
tenure, by 1973 most of them would fall in the 20 to 24 age group. It 
seems likely, then, that POHT men contributed significantly to high 
unemployment rates among black Vietnam veterans. Project 100,000 
certainly failed to accomplish one of its primary stated goals: the 
"uplifting" of black males.
BUcks ANd The MiliTARy
The US Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1963 that 
“Negro servicemen believe on balance that the Armed Forces offer 
them greater career opportunities than they can find in the civilian 
economy.”38 In a 1965 survey, 40% of the black men questioned listed 
self-advancement as their reason for enlistment. Some all-volunteer 
airborne divisions were 24% black.39 Until 1967, black reenlistment 
rates for all service fields except communications and intelligence, 
technical specialties, and medical and dental were between 47% and 
49%-40 Observing these statistics, Moynihan viewed the military as “a 
socializing experience for the poor... until their environment begins 
turning out equal citizens.”41 But pre-1967 rates of black enlistment 
and re-enlistment may not have been indications of black patriotism— 
black men may have had few other available options.
Moynihan did not realize that for many black soldiers, the 
“socializing experience" of the Vietnam-era soldier would come in the 
jungles and deltas of South east Asia. In 1963—the same year in which 
the Commission on Civil Rights claimed that the military offered black 
soldiers great advancement opportunities—20% of all personnel 
assigned to combat were black.42 Some black men volunteered for 
combat in order to earn higher wages for high risk assignments. More
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frequently, however, the lower educational and technical skill level of 
black enlistees and draftees led to infantry duty.
The disproportionately high number of black men in combat 
units translated into disproportionately high casualty and death 
rates. While black Americans represented 11% of the population and 
8% of the military between 1961 and 1966, they comprised 16% of all 
combat deaths in Vietnam. In 1965,23.5% of all Army personnel killed 
in action were black.43 The DOD attributed unusually high black 
casualty and death rates to the frequency with which black men 
volunteered for elite combat forces like Airborne or the Green Berets, 
but overlooked the fact that many of these men qualified for no 
positions other than infantry duty. Between 1965 and 1970, blacks 
comprised 9.3% of total active duty personnel in Vietnam, yet they 
suffered 12.6% of the deaths. Black death rates exceeded by 35.5% 
the rates for all servicemen, and exceeded by 30% the rates for those 
men in Indochina.44
The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service found 
large discrepancies between draft rates for blacks and whites. In 1966, 
30.2% of blacks who joined the service were drafted, as opposed to only 
18.8% of all whites. The Commission hypothesized that black men 
were less likely to enlist because fewer of them were admitted into the 
reserves and officer service programs. As a result, blacks comprised 
a larger percentage of the draft pool. Commission figures confirmed 
this lack of representation in the reserves, revealing that only 2.8% of 
all nonwhites had any reserve duty experience, while 15.5% of gill 
whites had some. An even more startling figure showed that only 0.2% 
of all nonwhites, versus 3.3% of all whites, were admitted into officer 
service programs.45 Clearly, the equality and opportunity which many 
ascribed to the Armed Forces was more illusion that reality.
The Commission’s report moved the DOD to instruct that 
admission standards for the reserves be identical to those for regular 
service. The reserves were a point of political controversy; critics 
asserted that many college students and other potential deferees 
enlisted in order to fulfill a patriotic duty and, at the same time, avoid 
going to Vietnam. Anti-war protesters, who included civil rights 
activists, college students, and others who felt the war was morally or 
politically insupportable, claimed that the reserves served as a haven 
from combat duty. In order to demonstrate the reserves’ exclusivity, 
the protesters cited the minute percentage of black men in the 
reserves, and compared that number to the high percentage of black 
men in combat. The DOD sent 3% of the reserves to Vietnam to serve 
as support troops in 1968, hoping to offset antiwar criticism, but the 
nature of the reserves was not substantially altered. By the end of 
1968, over 100,000 men had signed up forthe National Guard waiting
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list, and at that time only 1% of the reserve forces were black.46
Further investigation of Armed Forces’ policy toward black 
Americans revealed that discrimination began even before these men 
entered the service. The Armed Forces consistently rejected black men 
at a higher rate than they rejected white men. Over half of all blacks 
failed to meet military standards: black males comprised 11% of the 
US population of 18-21 year olds, and less than 5.5% of these men 
qualified for military service.
Both the AFQT, which determined mental fitness for service, 
and the exam for deferment contained implicit biases towards whites. 
In addition, if a black man passed the AFQT and wanted deferment for 
educational reasons, he had to pass the draft deferment test. An 
official from Science Research Associates (the company that lost the 
bid for the draft deferment test design to Educational Testing Services) 
claimed that “the test is culturally weighted to favor the white, middle- 
class and upper-class student, as are all tests of this type.”47
Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York recognized 
the test’s racial bias in 1966, predicting that
An excessively disproportionate number o f those falling 
would be black students. The draft deferment test brings the 
circle o f racial discrimination full cycle. First, we provide an 
inferior education for black students. Next we give them a 
series o f tests which many will flunk because o f an inferior 
education. Then we pack these academic failures off to 
Vietnam to be killed.48
Other critics of the militaiy’s testing policies questioned the tests’ 
accuracy at determining standardized “dimensions of achievement 
across different groups.”49 The draft deferment test qualified candidates 
on the assumption that the highest scorers would be most successful 
in their chosen career paths, although a 1964 Columbia University 
study showed that academic achievers were more likely to attain lower 
levels of professional achievement.50 The AFQT, critics claimed, failed 
to measure “idealism, stamina, persistence, and creativity."51
L. Mendel Rivers, chair of theHouse Armed Services Committee, 
commented on rising military manpower requirements, stating “The 
Army is good for a man’s soul.”52 In 1965, 230,991 souls were 
improved by the draft, and in 1966 their numbers rose to 331.000.53 
Rivers’ view of the Army as a reforming institution may have had some 
effect on the decisions of local draft board members, who inducted a 
startling percentage of qualified black men. Though 94.5% of the men 
who qualified for the draft were white, black men made up 8% of the 
military overall—and 11% of the military personnel in Vietnam. The 
black draft rate increased at a much faster rate than did the general
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draft rate. Although black citizens comprised 11% of the American 
population, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 
cited studies which showed that, of qualified men, 30% of blacks (in 
contrast to 18% of whites) were drafted.54
In 1967, the National Advisory Commission on Selective 
Service revealed additional unbalanced induction figures for men with 
military experience: 27% of white men and 42% of black men with 
military experience were drafted.55 Racial imbalances like these occurred 
because of institutionalized policies of discrimination at the local 
level—especially in southern states.
October 1966 figures show that only 1.3% of all local draft 
board members were black. Seven states had no black draft board 
members, including Mississippi, where 42% of the population was 
black. Blacks were also unrepresented on draft boards in Alabama 
(30% black population), Louisiana (31.9% black population), and 
South Carolina (34.8% black population).56 The state Governor 
appointed draft board members, who frequently lived in wealthy 
districts far from their jurisdictions, and had little contact with 
community members. Racial discrimination on some local boards 
went further than a simple lack of representation—the New Orleans 
draft board had one member who had also served as the head of the 
Ku Klux Klan.57
Most black leaders were acutely aware of the military's 
discriminatory policies, and were incensed by Moynihan's suggestion 
that the Armed Forces could improve the status of black men by 
“socializing" them. To many, the idea that black men “deserved” larger 
military participation seemed a transparent excuse for sending even 
more black men to die in Vietnam. The white administration had 
seemingly developed the perfect cover for a genocidal campaign 
against black Americans. In his essay “Hell No, Black Men Won’t Go," 
Gayle Addison, Jr. recalled a World War 2 newspaper editorial which 
he felt expressed the United States’ current intentions in Vietnam. The 
Waterbury Times opined:
It seems a pity to waste good white men in battle with such 
a foe. The cost o f sacrifice would be nearly equalized were the 
job assigned to Negro troops...-. An army of nearly a million 
could probably be recruited from the Negroes o f this country 
without drawing from its industrial strength or commercial 
life....59
The complaints of black leaders were many and varied. The 
money spent on the war and defense, some argued, could be better 
spent to alleviate American domestic problems. Black men were 
fighting to help Vietnamese secure freedoms which black citizens did
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not have at home In America. There was a strong sense that black 
Americans were being robbed of their future, that the “talented tenth” 
of black youth were being shipped off to die in Vietnam.60 Eldridge 
Cleaver saw serious global repercussions to the black image:
It is no accident that the U.S. Government is sending all those 
black troops to Vietnam. Some people think that Vietnam is 
to kill off the cream of black youth. But it has another 
important result. By turning her black troops into the 
butchers o f the Vietnamese people, America is spreading 
hate against the black race throughout Asia.... Black 
Americans are considered to be the world's greatest fools to 
go to another country to fight for something they don’t have 
for themselves.61
ONE-Thind of a Nation: Rejectees ANd Awviy Policy
Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor and Chair of the President’s 
Task Force on Manpower Conservation, opened the 1964 report One 
Third o f a Nation with a letter lamenting the fact that “Fully a third of 
the age group does not meet the required standards of health and 
education. Far too many of these young men have missed out on the 
American miracle.”62 In the year of the report’s publication, 1,400,000 
men turned 18. According to report estimates, one-third of them 
would be disqualified, for some reason, from participation in the 
Armed Services. The Task Force concluded:
O f persons who have recently failed the mental test... a major 
proportion of these young men are the products o f poverty.
They have inherited their situation from their parents, and 
unless the cycle is broken, they will almost surely transmit 
it to their children.63
The rejectee group of 1964 consisted of about 600,000 men, 
and the correct conclusion that most of these men had grown up in 
poverty was based on the similarity of rejectees’ background 
characteristics. Most of these men had little education: 40% of mental 
rejectees had only completed elementary school, and 80% had not 
finished high school.64 50% of the rejectees came from families with 
annual incomes of less than $4,000. and 20% came from households 
with annual incomes under $2,000. 70% of rejectees came from 
homes with more than four children and 50% came from homes with 
more than six children.65 A  1963 poll published similar statistics: of 
2500 rejectees, 30% had left school before the age of 17 in order to 
support themselves or their families. (Half of all rejected black men 
cited this reason for leaving school.66) The 1963 poll revealed that 21%
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of the rejectees came from families who had received public aid during 
the past five years; 14% of them presently received public aid. 31% 
came from families in which the parents had divorced or separated, 
and 9% of these men had court records.67
Investigations at the time of the poll determined that these men 
had not escaped the poverty environment in which they had matured. 
31% of rejectees were unemployed (a figure four times that of the 
average 18 year old male), and those who did work held low-skill, low- 
payingjobs.68 Rejectees earned almost one-third less than the average 
income of all those in their age group; they had an annual income of 
$1,850 while their peers earned an average of $2,656 a year.69 Based 
on these figures, the Task Force concluded that those who failed to 
qualify for the Armed Forces had a high chance of failing in other areas 
of life.
Altogether, including those disqualified for mental and physical 
reasons, 49.8% of men tested in 1962 failed to meet Armed Forces 
standards. Of those men who took the AFQT in 1962, 306,073 failed 
the intelligence tests; “It was determined that they lacked the mental 
equipment to be able to absorb military training within a reasonable 
time. The most common deficiency was apparently that they could not 
read or do simple arithmetic.”70
In addition to these depressing statistics, the report gathered 
some hopeful figures. Of the 2500 rejectees polled in 1963, the 
majority ofboth employed and unemployed men expressed a willingness 
to obtain additional training and education, even if they had to leave 
home to obtain it. The rate of willingness of black men greatly exceeded 
that of whites, with 78% of working black men, and only 56% of white 
men, desirous of more education. 85% of black men looking for work 
wanted training and remedial education, while only 74% of their white 
peers wanted these opportunities. Even among those not actively 
seeking employment, 79% of blacks and only 59% of whites were ready 
to leave home to receive training. A  nationwide survey of rejectees 
found 96% of nonwhites desirous of basic education and job training.71
The Task Force suggested that: “The President should
announce a Nationwide Manpower Conservation Program to provide 
persons who fail to meet the qualifications for military service with the 
needed education, training, health rehabilitation, and related services 
that will enable them to become effective and self-supporting citizens.”72 
Three years later, the Marshall Commission echoed the Task Force’s 
call for national programs to help rejectees, but it gave the job of 
manpower conservation to the Pentagon. While educational and 
training programs for these men were included in the Task Forces’ 
initial recommendations, these programs were not the primary goal 
of the Marshall Commission’s plan. Its goal had shifted from assisting
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rejectees to achieving “the objective, insofar as it proves practicable, 
of accepting volunteers who do not meet induction standards but who 
can be brought up to a level of usefulness as a soldier, even if this 
requires special educational and training programs to be conducted 
by the Armed Services. ”73
The National Advisory Commission report offered no less bleak 
an image of American rejectees than its predecessor. Figures published 
in 1965 showed that 62% of rejectees failed for physical and mental 
reasons, while 38% failed because they were not judged to meet a 
vague and flexible “moral”74 standard. Marshall Commission race- 
based statistics agreed with those of the earlier report: 49.7% of black 
men and 24.7% of white men in the 26 to29year old age bracket were 
judged unfit for service.75 The National Advisory Commission report 
also found that low income slum areas had the largest percentages of 
rejectees and the least percentages of student deferments.76
The Marshall Commission generalized its conclusions, and 
predicted that a man was likely to fail the AFQT if he had less than an 
eighth grade education, or if he was a black high school dropout. The 
report cited the fact that so many American men failed the AFQT and 
other minimum standards tests as a “national security risk” and 
emphasized that unfitness was a result of “the years of their youth and 
development, in conditions of poverty and discrimination, inadequate 
education, and poor medical facilities.”77 The Commission’s 
investigations had begun months before McNamara made public his 
plan for Project 100,000, but the report was released seven months 
after the announcement. The report strongly supported the DOD’s 
new program, claiming that it would train men and improve their 
condition once they had entered the service.
The Commission tendered suggestions which directly 
contradicted the conclusions of Ginzburg’s 1950 report. The Ineffective 
Soldier—a report taken very seriously by the post-World War 2 
military, and which had originally spurred the Armed Forces to adopt 
the AFQT. The AFQT was designed to measure mental ability, and to 
screen out men unable to acquire military skills. If a man scored in 
the passing range on the 100 point test, and he qualified for no 
deferments, he was ranked 1-A. Those who failed the test, but scored 
between 10 and 30 received the ranking of 1-Y, and were placed in 
Category 4. (Categories 1, 2, and 3 automatically qualified for service. 
Category 4 was marginally qualified, and Category 5 was automatically 
disqualified.) Most Category 4 men were disqualified from service 
during periods of peace, since the Armed Forces could then afford to 
be discriminating. During periods of conflict, however, men who had 
received a 1-Y ranking had a good chance of being accepted by the 
militaiy, since SS had to expand the pool of qualified men in order to
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meet military manpower needs.
Historically, Armed Forces admission standards have fluctuated 
with the manpower demands of wartime and peacetime. The AFQT 
was designed as a measuring device; a way to classify men for military 
induction. For example, during World War 2 and the Korean War, 
when available men were scarce, the overall military rejection rates 
were 30% and 37% respectively. During the peaceful period in the 
early 1960s, before the US had committed its forces to Vietnam, 
rejection rates rose from 49% in 1961 to 57.9% in 1964.78 By December 
1966, the preinduction rejection rate had dropped to 34%.79
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the military made a 
great effort to prevent the enlistment of men who could potentially 
cause disciplinary problems, have psychiatric disorders, or might 
otherwise fail to meet the Armed Forces’ rigorous mental and physical 
demands. The number of men in the Armed Services with 5 to 8 years 
of education dropped from 23.6% in 1953 to 10.8% in 1959, while the 
percentage of men with 12 years of education rose from 35.3% to 53%. 
Department of Defense officials explained the changes:
This raising o f intellectual standards can be regarded as an 
important factor in decreasing non-effectiveness, since in the 
past the prisoner group contained three times the proportion 
o f individuals with an eighth grade or less education than the 
general troop population. Also it is a reasonable assumption 
that individuals with lower intellectual capability have greater 
difficulty in adjustment than persons o f average intelligence 
and thus more frequently become psychiatric problems or 
disciplinary offenders.80
During this same period, the Armed Forces maintained a high rate of 
less than honorable discharges, as it eliminated men who had 
disciplinary problems and were not needed during peacetime. A  study 
by Army psychiatrists explained the rationale for these higher rejection 
and discharge rates: “The smaller and cadre-type Army in peace time 
has less opportunities for the utilization of marginal personnel.”81
1965 was the first year in more than a decade to see military 
rejection rates fall. In this same year, many began to question the 
validity of the AFQT. “Perhaps the militaiy criteria for physical and 
mental fitness,” conjectured one congressman, “is simply a more 
convenient way for them to eliminate the numbers subject to the draft 
which is in excess to their needs.”82 Other critics expressed indignation 
at the falling rates, insinuating that during times of low manpower 
needs, the Armed Forces denied rehabilitation and training to men 
with limited skills and physical ability, but during times of high need—
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wartime—these same men were inducted, enlisted, and hastily trained 
for combat. When SS devised the 1-Y classification in 1962, General 
Hershey defined 1 -Ymen as “not too objectionable for war, not perfect 
enough for 1-A in peacetime, but acceptable in an emergency.”83
CONClusiON
McNamara's goal when he founded POHT was to admit 40,000 
former rejectees in 1966, and 100,000 more each year. More than
300.000 men joined the Armed Services as New Standards admittees 
between 1966 and 1971.84 Because most of these men could not attain 
the skill level for special technical training, over 40% of them were 
assigned to combat units, and in the Army and Marines, over 50% of 
them went to Vietnam.85 An estimated 10% of New Standards men 
were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged in the first eighteen 
months of their service.86 Although the whole premise of the Project
100.000 program was to provide education and training for these men, 
only 7.5% of them received any remedial education and skills training.87 
In 1971, because of high costs, waning manpower needs, and de- 
escalation in Vietnam, Project 100,000 ended.
Proj ect 100,000 assumed the gu ise of a social program with the 
primary goal of helping black youth and reconstructing “the fabric of 
black society.”88 In reality, the Johnson administration, the DOD, and 
the Armed Forces used Project 100,000 to further their own agenda by 
sending over 100,000 NSM (about 50,000 of them black) to fight and 
die in Vietnam. The Administration had little time and money to devote 
to the war against poverty and the campaign for civil rights. But by 
adopting the paternalistic hypotheses of selected government reports, 
Johnson and McNamara constructed the pretense of Project 100,000. 
Not only would the program provide soldiers to produce the body 
counts on which the Vietnam War focused, it would also temporarily 
eliminate pressure on the administration to show its support for civil 
rights.
The past and present discrimination experienced by blacks in 
the military might have indicated that the Armed Forces were not the 
Ideal environment in which to nurture a new generation of black men. 
The Ginzburg study had revealed that rejectees would not be soldiers 
of great potential and ability. And already, disproportionate numbers 
of blackmen served, fought, and died in Vietnam (along with poor men 
of all races). The Ineffective Soldier should have served as a warning to 
the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service that if it 
focused on the mentally and socially disadvantaged it would not find 
a reasonable and just answer to the question “Who shall serve when 
not all shall serve?”
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After POHTs inception, the DOD should have discerned that 
the program would not be successful. Repeated cases of desertion, 
disciplinary problems, mental incompetency, and physical incapacity 
should have alerted the DOD to the fact that POHT was not an 
overwhelming success. But as long as the Vietnam conflict required 
troops, the Pentagon persevered in its insistence on the program’s 
soundness.
Project 100,000 also played an important political role for the 
Johnson Administration. By enlarging the pool of prospective draftees, 
the Administration could continue the war in Vietnam without calling 
in the reserves or drafting college students. Since college students 
served as the voice for anti-war protest, POHT permitted Johnson to 
avoid arousing increased protest from that group. NSM were neither 
vocal nor politically inclined, and many of them welcomed the Armed 
Forces’ guarantees of training, education, and excitement.
Project 100,00, although profitable to the Administration, 
benefitted none of those whom it professed to help. As the Marines’ 
self-imposed release rate of POHT men and the antagonism on the part 
of career officers illustrates, NSM were more often a nuisance than a 
benefit to the military. Nor did most of the poor and uneducated 
minorities recruited by the program come home better educated or 
more self-confident. Black POHT veterans returned from Vietnam to 
the same poor conditions as other Vietnam veterans.
By making the black family the scapegoat for America’s racial 
problems, Moynihan had given the administration an excuse to send 
unreasonably high numbers of black men to war. Moynihan’s theory 
provided Johnson with a way to avoid implementing more practical, 
useful, and fair methods for alleviating black poverty. Many of the 
black families whom Moynihan claimed POHT would benefit had to 
contend, during and after the war, with the grief of losing family 
members, emotional traumas caused by combat, injuries, 
unemployment, and social instability, in addition to the trials of 
poverty and American racism. Project 100,000 did not help to solve the 
problems of poor black Americans: it compounded old problems and 
created new ones.
1 The basic foundation upon which this decision rested was the January 
1964 report, One-Third o f a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified 
for Military Service, prepared by the Presidential Task Force on Manpower 
Conservation, which was headed by Assistant Secretary o f Labor Daniel 
Moynihan. The report stated that every year almost 600,000 young men, or 
about one-third o f the 1.8 men eligible for service, were found “unfit" because 
they failed the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The report also found
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that a high proportion o f these men belonged to minority groups. In 1965, 
DOD records reported that 56% of all black men failed the AFQT. One Third 
o f a Nation concluded that Black men failed the AFQT primarily because they 
suffered from educational disadvantages. This argument was logically extended 
in the 1965 Moynihan Report on the black family. Assuming that poor 
education and academic performance on the part o f many black men was only 
a symptom of a disturbance in “normal” family relations, the Moynihan Report 
hypothesized that service in the Armed Forces represented the best way to 
boost the self-esteem and confidence o f black men. Under a section headed 
“The Armed Forces", the authors o f the 1965 report stated:
Service in the United States Armed Forces is the only experience 
open to the Negro American in which he is truly treated as an 
equal.... it is an utterly masculine world. Given the strains o f the 
disorganized matrifocal family life in which so many Negro youth 
come o f age, the Armed Forces are a drastic and desperately 
needed change: a world away from women, a world run by strong 
men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is 
nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if 
limited, are granted on the basis o f performance. The theme o f a 
current Army recruiting message states it as clearly as can be: “In 
the U.S. Army you get to know what it feels like to be a man."
[The President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation. One Third ofa Nation: 
A Report on Young Men found Unqualifiedfor Military Service (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office) January 1964: 2. And, Office o f Policy
Planning and Research, US Dept, o f Labor, The Negro Family: The Case for 
National Action (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) March 
1965.)
2 Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss. Chance & Circumstance: The 
Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Vintage) 1978: 126.
3 Ibid.
4 Robert S. McNamara, “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ils,” Vital Speeches 
of the Day, 34: 4(1967): 98.
5 At a planning conference for a study on black Americans, sponsored by 
Daedalus and the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences, Moynihan made 
known his opinions on the state o f black America: “I think the problem o f the 
Negro family is practically the property o f the American government. I mean, 
we spend most o f our money on this... in health, in welfare, and on 
employment, and yet we know nothing about it.” [Rainwater, Lee & William L. 
Yancey. The Moynihan Report & the Politics o f Controversy (Boston: MIT Press) 
1967: 75.) In March 1965, Moynihan produced his controversial report. The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action. The report concluded that, 
because o f a history o f discrimination and lack of opportunity, the black 
American family was deteriorating. This breakdown, said the report, resulted 
from the fact that American society disempowered black American men, who 
consequently could not support a typical patriarchal family. Moynihan, in 
different sections of the report, summarized the situation:
At the heart o f the deterioration of the fabric o f Negro society
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is the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental 
source o f the weakness of the Negro community at the 
present time.... In essence, the Negro community has been 
forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out 
o f line with the rest o f American society, seriously retards the 
progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing 
burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great 
many Negro women as well.
The report documented the black family's “instability” by reporting high 
fertility rates, incidences o f teenage pregnancy, welfare dependency rates, 
divorce, separation, and desertion rates, and unemployment rates. Black 
Americans, Moynihan explained, were trapped in a “tangle o f pathology”: high 
crime rates, narcotics addiction, and alienation from white society. As a result 
o f this “unsound” familial and social structure, black children, in Moynihan's 
estimation, lacked proper role models and thus had no aspirations to rise in 
American society. Moynihan contrasted black families with the typical white 
family who, “despite many variants, remains a powerful agency... for 
transmitting... valuable contracts o f the world o f education and work.”
When the Department o f Labor unofficially released the Moynihan Report 
in 1965, both government officials and civil rights leaders hastened to criticize 
it. Citing the report as incomplete and overdrawn, Bayard Rustin o f the A. 
Philip Randolph Institute, Whitney Young o f the National Urban League, 
Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP, and John Lewis o f SNCC criticized both the 
report and Moynihan. The report, they complained, focused on socioeconomic 
measures, and not antidiscrimination. Despite the expert status attributed to 
him by the white political and social establishment, Moynihan had few 
contacts with the black community or the civil rights movement. Furthermore, 
he fit the stereotype of the “white liberal", against which militant and 
separatist groups such as the Black Muslims rebelled. Ignoring the criticisms 
o f many black leaders, Johnson and McNamara embraced Moynihan's 
conclusions.
The report suggested several solutions to the problem of the black family, 
including universal employment for all black men (which Moynihan proposed 
could be achieved by placing black men into traditionally female jobs). He also 
recommended housing and birth control programs. By focusing on statistics 
and de-emphasizing the continuing impact o f economic and social 
discrimination, Moynihan could maintain his narrow focus on the problems 
o f the black family. Accordingly, he also suggested limited solutions. 
Ultimately, his most influential and dangerous suggestion was that the 
position of the black male could be strengthened if he were offered greater 
opportunities in the Armed Forces.
Moynihan’s focus on the Armed Forces as a solution to the problems of the 
black family was not coincidental. The year before the report on the black 
family was issued, Moynihan helped lead the Task Force on Manpower 
Conservation, which produced One Third o f a Nation. Service in the Armed 
Forces, or “The American Miracle", as Task Force Chairman Willard Wirtz 
referred to it, seemed to Moynihan an ideal solution to the poor education.
54 V ietnam Generation
employment prospects, and social status o f black men, and to the increasing 
manpower needs o f the Vietnam conflict. In 1964, black Americans comprised 
11% of the population, but only 8% o f the military. Moynihan carried his 
proposals further in his 1965 report, stating:
The ultimate mark of inadequate preparation for life is the 
failure rate on the Armed Forces mental test. A  grown man 
who cannot pass this test is in trouble. 56% of Negroes fail it.
This is a rate almost four times that of the whites.
Military service is disruptive in some respects. For those 
comparatively few who are killed or wounded in combat or 
otherwise, the personal sacrifice is inestimable. But on 
balance, service in the Armed Forces over the past quarter- 
century has worked greatly to the advantage ofthose involved.
The training and experience o f military duty is unique; the 
advantages that have generally followed... are singular, to 
say the least.
Despite the fact that by 1966, the number o f black troops in Vietnam was 
commensurate with their proportion of the population, Moynihan believed so 
adamantly in the advantages o f military service that he advocated even greater 
black participation. The 1960s’ single most important psychological event in 
race relations, he contended in a 1966 New Republic article,
was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV screens 
o f America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one of 
the oldest known routes to social equality.... Moreover, as 
employment pure and simple, the armed forces have much to 
offer men with the limited current options of, say. Southern 
Negroes. By rights, Negroes are entitled to a larger share of 
employment in the armed forces and might well be demanding 
one. (Rainwater 33-34)
[Office o f Policy Planning and Research, US Dept, o f Labor,
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office) March 1965.] For an 
extended discussion o f black responses to Moynihan, see 
Rainwater and Yancey.
6 McNamara: 101.
7 Many accepted authorities on the Vietnam War, such as Stanley Kamow 
and Gloria Emerson, fail entirely to mention Project 100,000 in their accounts 
o f the conflict. In addition, several authors who do include POHT in their 
studies accept the Administration's line without question. For example. 
Rainwater and Yancey's The Moynihan Report mentions POHT only as a by­
product o f the study; they fail to attach any importance to it. Jean Carper’s 
Bitter Greetings considers POHT as an example o f the draft's unfairness and 
does not question McNamara and Moynihan’s belief that these men were 
capable o f becoming good soldiers. Baskir and Strauss' Chance and 
Circumstance contained the only in-depth assessment of the motives behind 
POHT. Interpretations critical o f the project are generally found only in books
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and essays dealing with inequities experienced by blacks in the military— 
such as Binkin and Eitelberg's Blacks in the Military.
8 Project 100,000 represented the second attempt o f the Johnson 
administration to create a program with the goal o f inducting under-qualified 
men into the Armed Forces. In late 1964, Johnson directed Selective Service 
to steer pre-induction rejectees into federally sponsored non-military assistance 
programs. This experiment, coined Project STEP (Special Training and 
Enlistment Program) tried to provide remedial job training skills and job 
referral services, with the goal of raising rejectees to the educational skill level 
o f normal soldiers. Ostensibly, they would receive training, get jobs, and also 
meet military qualification standards. 134,000 men participated in Project 
STEP, which proved a disappointment in three ways. First, o f 134,000 letters 
written to prospective employers by the rejectee group, only 20% were 
answered. Second, the program referred less than 4% of the men for jobs; 
2,200 men eventually got Jobs, while only 189 participated in job training 
programs. Third, Congress refused to provide the $10 million which the 
Pentagon requested to fund Project STEP. This program, which used the DOD 
as a tool for implementing domestic social programs, marked the President’s 
first attempt to use the military as a vehicle for his domestic policies. It would 
not be the last time such an attempt failed. [Baskir: 125]
9 Jean Carper. Bitter Greetings: The Scandal o f the Military Drajt (New York: 
Grossman) 1967: 158.
10 McNamara made this last requirement impossible to fulfill, however, 
since he adamantly insisted that NSM should not be stigmatized by their 
designation. NSM were never informed who they were, and a common service 
number, which in 1967 became an alphabet code, was the only indication that 
a recruit came from POHT. Nevertheless, poor physical or mental performance 
generally made these men easy to identify. NSM came to be known by their 
military peers as "the moron corps” and “McNamara’s idiots”.
11 Binkin, Martin & Mark Eitelberg. Blacks in the Military (Washington, DC: 









20 The Comptroller General of the United States. Management o f the Project 
100,000 Program (Department of the Army) December 1969: 6.
21 Paul Starr. The Discarded Army—Veterans After Vietnam: The Nader 
Report on Vietnam Veterans and the Veterans Administration (Washington, 
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22 Comptroller General: 20.
23 Between 1968 and 1970 the costs for POHT more than doubled. In 1968, 
the GAO estimated the cost for the entire program at $5.2 million. By 1969 the
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cost grew to $11.2 million, and by 1970 it was $12.8 million. [Binkin: 128]
24 Comptroller General: 28.
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